SERB OPINION 2006-008

STATE OF OHIO
BEFORE THE STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

In the Matter of

Municipal Construction Equipment Operators' Labor Council,

Employee Organization,

and

International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18,

Employee Organization,

and

City of Cleveland,

Employer.

Case No. 2002-REP-06-0116

DIRECTIVE
(OPINION ATTACHED)

Before Chairman Mayton, Vice Chairman Gillmor, and Board Member Verich: September 28, 2006.

On April 11, 2005, the Municipal Construction Equipment Operators' Labor Council ("MCEOLC") filed a "Petition for Administrative Hearing," in which it requested that the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB" or "Board") appoint a hearing examiner to adjudicate certain issues that the Ohio Supreme Court had found, in Consolo v. City of Cleveland (2004), 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, to be within SERB's jurisdiction. On August 25, 2005, the Board issued an Order Directing Administrative Hearing identifying seven questions to be addressed through the hearing by the Administrative Law Judge.

On February 6, 2006, a hearing was held. Subsequently, all parties filed post-hearing briefs. On July 20, 2006, a Recommended Determination was issued by the Administrative Law Judge. On August 16, 2006, the City of Cleveland filed exceptions to the Recommended Determination. On August 29, 2006, MCEOLC filed a response to the exceptions. On September 1, 2006, the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 filed a petition to join the response of MCEOLC in support of the Recommended Determination.

After reviewing the record, the Recommended Determination, the Employer's exceptions, the Employee Organizations' responses to the exceptions, and all other filings in this case, the Board construes the Analysis and Discussion in the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Determination as Conclusions of Law; adopts the Introduction, Procedural History, Issues, Findings of Fact, and Analysis and Discussion/Conclusions of Law in the Administrative Law Judge's Recommended Determination, incorporated by reference; and finds that: (1) International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 was not a deemed-certified bargaining agent on or before April 1, 1984, for those persons employed by the City of Cleveland as construction equipment operators; (2) International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 was not the exclusive representative for the construction equipment operators at any time during the period of 1994 through 1998; (3) the City of Cleveland and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 informed the construction equipment operators of the prevailing wage rate agreed to by International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 and the City of Cleveland to settle a contempt action, but International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 did not negotiate a decrease in compensation of those persons employed by the City of Cleveland as construction equipment operators with the knowledge or consent of the construction equipment operators; (4) no evidence was presented in the record showing that International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 informed the City of Cleveland that the construction equipment operators themselves, as individual employees, had agreed to a decrease in compensation; (5) the wages of the construction equipment operators who were appellees in Consolo v. City of Cleveland (2004), 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389, were not the result of collective bargaining between International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 and the City of Cleveland; and (6) no evidence was presented in the record showing that any benefits package was negotiated or implemented for the construction equipment operators until February 2005, which was after SERB certified the Municipal Construction Equipment Operators' Labor Council as the construction equipment operators' exclusive representative in January 2003.

It is so ordered.

MAYTON, Chairman; GILLMOR, Vice Chairman; and VERICH, Board Member, concur.

CRAIG R. MAYTON, CHAIRMAN

You are hereby notified that an appeal may be perfected, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 119.12, by filing a notice of appeal with the State Employment Relations Board at 65 East State Street, 12th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215-4213, and with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas within fifteen days after the mailing of the State Employment Relations Board's directive.

I certify that a copy of this document was served upon each party's representative by certified mail, return receipt requested, this 5th day of October, 2006.

Donna J. Glanton

DONNA J. GLANTON, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

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SERB OPINION 2006-008

STATE OF OHIO
BEFORE THE STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

MUNICIPAL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT OPERATORS' LABOR COUNCIL,

Employee Organization,

and

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 18,

Employee Organization,

and

CITY OF CLEVELAND,

Employer.

CASE NO. 02-REP-06-0116

BETH A. JEWELL
Administrative Law Judge

RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 11, 2005, the Municipal Construction Equipment Operators' Labor Council ("MCEOLC") filed a "Petition for Administrative Hearing," in which it requested that the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB" or "Board") appoint a hearing examiner to adjudicate certain issues that the Ohio Supreme Court had found to be within SERB's jurisdiction in Consolo v. City of Cleveland (2004), 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389. On August 25, 2005, the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB" or "Board") issued an Order Directing Administrative Hearing. In its order, SERB stated as follows:

> We have considered the arguments raised by Local 18 and the Employer maintaining that the Board possesses no legal authority to conduct such a hearing outside the parameters of an unfair labor practice charge proceeding. However, in this particular matter, in which the Ohio Supreme Court has specifically identified issues that it says must first be addressed by SERB, we have decided to exercise our plenary jurisdiction to resolve them. We are cognizant of the mandate of Ohio Revised Code § 4117.22, which charges SERB with construing Chapter 4117 liberally to promote orderly and constructive relationships between public employers and public employees.

Thereafter, the Board assigned this Administrative Law Judge to take testimony for the purpose of preparing recommendations to the Board on seven questions. A hearing was held on February 6, 2006, wherein testimonial and documentary evidence was presented. Subsequently, all parties filed post-hearing briefs.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1973, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Pinzone v. Cleveland (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 26 ("Pinzone"), holding that, under Section 191 of the City Charter of the City of Cleveland, wages for building and construction trades employees working for the City should be paid at the prevailing wage rates in the private sector, in accordance with a private sector contract between Cleveland Building and Construction Trades Employers Association and the Mechanical Contractors Association. The City argued that such items as paid sick leave, greater job security and more steady employment could be offset against the higher base wage in private industry. The Court disagreed: "Permitting an offset for such 'fringe benefits' would necessarily encourage arbitrary and probably inaccurate lowerings of the base municipal wage scale. Clearly, this is not the intent or meaning of Section 191." Pinzone, supra at 31.

In State ex rel. Internatl. Union of Operating Engineers v. Cleveland (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 537 ("IUOE"), an action in mandamus brought by Local 18 as the bargaining representative for construction equipment operators and master mechanics (collectively, "CEOs") working for the City, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the City to pay back and future wages to the CEOs in accordance with the City Charter.

In 2001, forty CEOs filed a complaint in the court of common pleas, asserting that the City was not compensating them in accordance with IUOE and the City Charter.[1] See Consolo v. Cleveland (2004), 103 Ohio St.3d 362, 2004-Ohio-5389 ("Consolo"). In Consolo, the CEOs claimed that the City stopped paying increases in prevailing wages after 1993 and that the City stopped paying pension contributions in 1998. The CEOs additionally claimed that in 1998, Local 18 negotiated with the City on their behalf but without their authorization. The CEOs claimed that Local 18 and the City verbally agreed that the CEOs would waive their rights to pension contributions and prevailing wage increases. Local 18 and the City argued that the CEOs' claims belonged before SERB as unfair labor practices because Local 18 was the CEOs' exclusive bargaining representative during the time periods in question. The trial court dismissed the CEOs' claims, holding that the allegations were tantamount to unfair labor practice claims and thus within SERB's exclusive jurisdiction. The CEOs appealed. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal, holding that SERB has the exclusive authority to determine whether the CEOs' compensation levels were the result of collective bargaining. However, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the following arguments asserted by the CEOs as appellees in the Consolo litigation:

[1] On January 30, 2003, SERB certified the MCEOLC as the exclusive representative of City employees in a bargaining unit including CEOs.

> It is important to note that the appellees' allegations are contrary to facts stipulated in IUOE. Appellees assert that Local 18 is not and never has been their exclusive bargaining representative. They also assert that the R.C. 4115.03(E) definition of "prevailing wage" is controlling. Before visiting the prevailing-wage issue, we first focus upon Local 18's relationship with appellees.
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> The city contends that appellees were in privity with Local 18 in IUOE and that the stipulations from IUOE estop appellees from asserting that Local 18 is not their exclusive bargaining representative. Collateral estoppel, however, does not apply because IUOE does not speak to Local 18's current status as collective-bargaining representative. Hence, even if appellees might otherwise have been estopped from litigating issues decided by IUOE, the identity of appellees' bargaining representative after 1992 was not an issue addressed in that opinion. Moreover, Local 18's status was neither actually litigated nor essential to our judgment. Local 18's status as a collective-bargaining representative appears to have been stipulated in IUOE to demonstrate its standing to file suit against the city. Here, appellees agree that Local 18 was a collective-bargaining agent but not their exclusive bargaining agent as contemplated by R.C. 4117.05. This distinction was immaterial to our IUOE decision. It may be key here. Therefore, IUOE does not bar appellees from arguing that Local 18 is not their exclusive bargaining agent.

Consolo, supra at 364-365. The Court concluded, in relevant part, as follows: "If appellees' compensation levels were the result of collective bargaining under R.C. Chapter 4117, then the city's charter provisions would be inapplicable.... If appellees prevail before SERB on their claim that their wages did not result from collective bargaining, then the city charter controls." Consolo, supra at 367.

Following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Consolo, the MCEOLC filed its "Petition for Administrative Hearing" with SERB.

III. ISSUES

The following seven questions were presented by the Board for the Administrative Law Judge's consideration:

1. Whether before April 1, 1984, the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 ("Local 18") ever was the deemed-certified representative of those persons employed by the City as construction equipment operators, who are now represented by the Municipal Construction Equipment Operators' Labor Council ("MCEOLC") as their exclusive bargaining agent.

2. If Question No. 1 is answered affirmatively, how long may a deemed certified representative retain that status if Local 18 never complied with the reporting requirements of § 4117.19[2]?

3. Was Local 18 the "exclusive representative" of those persons employed by the City of Cleveland ("City") as construction equipment operators anytime during the period of 1994 through 1998?

4. Did Local 18 negotiate with the City a decrease in compensation of those persons employed by the City as construction equipment operators without their knowledge or consent?

5. Did Local 18 falsely inform the City that those persons employed by the City as construction equipment operators had agreed to a decrease in compensation?

6. Were the wages of the construction equipment operators who were appellees in Consolo v. City of Cleveland (2004), 103 Ohio St.3d 362, [2004-Ohio-5389,] the result of collective bargaining between Local 18 and the City?

7. Did the City and Local 18 negotiate and implement a benefits package that provided the construction equipment operators described above in Paragraph (6) with equal or better benefits than are provided by the City Charter?

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT[3]

1. The MCEOLC is an "employee organization" as defined in § 4117.01(D). (Consent Election Agreement, December 2002, SERB Case No. 02-REP-06-0116)

2. The International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 ("Local 18"), is an "employee organization" as defined in § 4117.01(D). (Consent Election Agreement, December 2002, SERB Case No. 02-REP-06-0116)

3. The City of Cleveland ("City") is a "public employer" as defined in § 4117.01(B). (Consent Election Agreement, December 2002, SERB Case No. 02-REP-06-0116)

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[2] All references to statutes are to the Ohio Revised Code, Chapter 4117, unless otherwise indicated.

[3] All references to the transcript of hearing are indicated parenthetically by "T.," followed by the page number(s). All references to the parties' stipulations of fact in the record are indicated parenthetically by "S.," followed by the stipulation number(s). References to the MCEOLC's exhibits in the record are indicated parenthetically by "P. Exh.," followed by the exhibit number(s). References to Local 18's exhibits in the record are indicated parenthetically by "U. Exh.," followed by the exhibit number(s). References to the City's exhibits in the record are indicated parenthetically by "C. Exh.," followed by the exhibit number(s). References to the record in the Findings of Fact are for convenience only and are not intended to suggest that such reference is the sole support in the record for that related finding of fact.

4. During the years before and at the time Chapter 4117 became effective, the Civil Service Employees Association ("CSEA") represented dues-paying civil service employees of the City by filing grievances on their behalf. The CSEA was open to all civil service employees, without regard to union affiliation. (T. 23, 57-58, 60)

5. Before and after Chapter 4117 became effective, the Construction Equipment Operators ("CEOs") working for the City received the prevailing wage under Section 191 of the City Charter. The CEOs relied upon Local 18 to inform the City of the current prevailing wage under Local 18's Building Agreement with the Construction Employers Association ("Building Agreement"). (T. 46, 111; U Exhs. 11-17; P. Exhs. 34-37)

6. On March 1, 1983, seven individual CEOs employed in the City's Water Department signed a letter to the Commissioner of the Water Department, accepting a new policy put in place by the department that clarified when the employees would receive overtime pay. Their signatures on the letter are witnessed by Local 18 Business Representative Dudley Snell. At that time, approximately 50 CEOs were employed by the City in various departments, including water, parks, streets, and the municipal power plant. (T. 124; C. Exh. 1, p. 7)

7. In 1987, employee organizations representing several bargaining units of employees working for the City entered into collective bargaining agreements with the City. These collective bargaining agreements typically involved wages in the amount of 80 percent of the prevailing wage rate, plus City fringe benefits. Although they were not receiving City fringe benefits, the CEOs did not want a collective bargaining agreement with a wage rate lower than the prevailing wage. The CEOs rejected the collective bargaining agreement proposed by the City. (T. 107-108; C. Exh. 1, pp. 7-9)

8. Between 1988 and 1996, many CEOs joined Local 18 and signed dues deduction authorization cards. (C. Exh. 8)

9. In 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus directing the City to comply with City Charter Section 191 by paying back and future wages to the City's CEOs in accordance with prevailing wage rates. Local 18 brought the mandamus action on behalf of its members who were working as CEOs for the City. State ex rel. Internatl. Union of Operating Engineers v. Cleveland (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 537 ("IUOE").

10. On August 6, 1996, a meeting of Local 18 members working for the City was held at Local 18's Cleveland headquarters. At this meeting, Local 18 President Dudley Snell asked the members if they would like to vote on whether they wanted Local 18 to negotiate a contract with the City on their behalf. The members voted not to authorize Local 18 to represent them in negotiating a contract with the City. (T. 25-26, 27, 106, 132; P. Exh. 45)

11. After 1993, the City disputed the prevailing wage rate it was required to pay the CEOs. The City argued that it was entitled to offset certain items from the private sector prevailing wage rate. Local 18 then filed a contempt action to compel the City to comply with the terms of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in IUOE, supra. In 1998, Local 18 and the City resolved this litigation by agreeing to a calculation of the prevailing wage rate that included a deduction for pension contributions, and Local 18 dismissed the contempt action. Local 18 President Snell and Assistant City Law Director Thomas Corrigan held a meeting with the CEOs to explain how Local 18 and the City had calculated the prevailing wage rate. The CEOs were not asked to vote on, and never voted to approve, the settlement of the litigation or the calculation of the prevailing wage rate. (T. 35-36, 134-135, 139-142, 143-144, 159-160; C. Exh. 1, pp. 24-27)

12. No City records can be found to indicate that the City Council approved a collective bargaining agreement between the City and a union that represented a bargaining unit including CEOs and master mechanics prior to February 14, 2005. (S., T. 12)

13. No City records indicate the receipt by the City prior to April 1, 1984, of a request for recognition by Local 18 to be the exclusive bargaining representative for a bargaining unit which included CEOs and master mechanics. (S., T. 13)

14. During the period of time from April 1, 1984 to February 5, 2002, SERB has no record of certification or recognition for the CEOs employed by the City in its Division of Streets or Division of Water. (P. Exh. 48)

15. On June 28, 2002, the MCEOLC filed a Request for Recognition with SERB, seeking to represent a proposed bargaining unit of City employees in the classifications of Master Mechanic, Construction Equipment Operator A, and Construction Equipment Operator B, within the City's Departments of Public Utilities and Public Service. (SERB Case No. 02-REP-06-0116)

16. Following the execution of a Consent Election Agreement, SERB conducted a secret ballot election on January 16, 2003. On January 30, 2003, SERB certified the MCEOLC as the exclusive representative of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit. (SERB Case No. 02-REP-06-0116)

V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

RECOMMENDED ANSWERS TO THE SEVEN QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether before April 1, 1984, the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18 ("Local 18") ever was the deemed certified representative of those persons employed by the City as construction equipment operators, who are now represented by the Municipal Construction Equipment Operators' Local Council ("MCEOLC") as their exclusive bargaining agent.

No. After examining the facts, and for the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Local 18 never was the deemed-certified representative of the CEOs.

1983 S 133, § 4, also referred to in SERB Opinions as the "temporary law" or the "uncodified law," provides in relevant part as follows:

> (A) Exclusive recognition through a written contract, agreement, or memorandum of understanding by a public employer to an employee organization whether specifically stated or through tradition, custom, practice, election, or negotiation the employee organization has been the only employee organization representing all employees in the unit is protected subject to the time restriction in division (B) of section 4117.05 of the Revised Code. Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, an employee organization recognized as the exclusive representative shall be deemed certified until challenged by another employee organization under the provisions of this act and the State Employment Relations Board has certified an exclusive representative.
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> (B) Any employee organization otherwise recognized by the public employer without a written contract, agreement, or memorandum of understanding shall continue to be recognized until challenged as provided in this act, and the Board has certified an exclusive representative.
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> (C) Nothing in this act shall be construed to permit an employer to terminate or refuse to make payroll deductions of dues, fees, or assessments to any employee organization pursuant to written authorization; except that the deductions may not continue to be made after another employee organization has been certified under this act by the Board.
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> (F) This act does not preclude any nonprofit, voluntary, bona fide organization which, by tradition, custom and practice, has engaged in the processing of grievances for public employees before political subdivision civil service commissions as of June 1, 1983, from providing the services it has heretofore offered on a voluntary basis or from receiving a voluntary check-off of dues.

In In re City of Akron, SERB 94-012 (4-28-94) ("Akron"), at p. 3-81, SERB explained deemed-certified status as follows:

> An employee organization has deemed-certified status if, at the time Chapter 4117 went into effect, it was recognized by the employer as the

> exclusive bargaining representative of certain employees of an employer in a specific bargaining unit. Thus, the crucial time for determining deemed-certified status is the law's effective date, April 1, 1984. The policy behind creating deemed-certified status was to preserve the status quo when the new law took effect and to ensure stability in public sector labor relations as the state entered an era of regulated collective bargaining.
>
> The controlling factor in determining deemed-certified status is the type of relationship existing between the employee organization and the employer on April 1, 1984, specifically whether the employer exclusively recognized the employee organization as the representative of certain employees of an employer in a given bargaining unit at that time. Obviously, the most significant indicator of exclusive recognition is a collective bargaining agreement or memorandum of understanding between the employee organization and the employer in effect on that date, which by its terms recognizes the employee organization as the exclusive representative. However, exclusive recognition not specifically written might be proven through tradition, custom, practice, election, or negotiation.

In this case, the parties agree that no collective bargaining agreement or other writing exists to establish Local 18 as the exclusive representative of the CEOs. Even Local 18 asserts that the CEOs limited Local 18's "representation" to periodically informing the City of the amount of the prevailing wage under the Building Agreement and to representing the CEOs in grievance proceedings.

SERB examined the concept of exclusive recognition established through tradition, practice and negotiation in SERB v. City of Bedford Hts., SERB 87-016 (7-24-87), aff'd 41 Ohio App. 3d 21 (11-25-87) ("Bedford Hts."). In Bedford Hts., a memorandum of understanding was in effect from January 1984 to December 1985, which encompassed the crucial time for deemed-certified status. However, the memorandum contained no provision recognizing the employee organization as the exclusive representative of the employees. Because the contract was silent on the issue of exclusive recognition, the Board looked to the parties' tradition, custom, and negotiation to ascertain the employee organization's status.

The facts in Bedford Hts. are significantly different from those presented in this case, where the parties have never entered into a contract. Here, as in Akron, supra, the absence of any collective bargaining agreement on April 1, 1984, presents particular difficulties in establishing exclusive recognition:

> Although exclusive recognition may conceivably be established without a formal contract in existence on April 1, 1984, the party seeking to prove such status without a contract has a substantial burden.... A collective bargaining agreement, even one without an exclusive recognition clause,

> is probative of the parties' relationship and may contribute to establishing exclusive recognition. The existence of a contract shows that the employer and the employee organization conducted negotiations on terms and conditions of employment. Typically, the contract identifies the employees covered by the contract or the bargaining unit. Where no contract exists, status must be proven solely by evidence of live conduct and interaction between the parties, which rises to the level of exclusivity.

Akron, supra at 3-82.

Here, without a contract, the City and Local 18 rely on dues deductions and grievance processing to establish exclusive representative status as of April 1, 1984. These factors are not persuasive. Under § 4(C) of the temporary law, an employer cannot refuse to make dues deductions under written authorization where no certified representative exists. But § 4(C) does not vest an employee organization with deemed-certified status. Under § 4(F) of the temporary law, an organization does not even have to be an employee organization to be allowed to continue processing grievances and have dues deducted if such was done as of June 1, 1983. An organization does not become deemed certified only by processing grievances and having dues deducted. Akron, supra at 3-82. Furthermore, the evidence in the record reveals that both Local 18 and the CSEA were involved in processing the CEOs' grievances. Even for grievance processing purposes, Local 18 was not an exclusive representative.

Moreover, the record does not establish that the City ever actually *negotiated* wages with Local 18 before April 1, 1984. The record shows only that Local 18 periodically wrote letters *informing* the City of the prevailing wage rate under the Building Agreement.[4] Even Local 18 does not characterize the CEOs' wages as being the result of collective bargaining: "The wages paid the CEOs were based upon the City Charter requiring the city of Cleveland, absent a collective bargaining agreement, to pay the prevailing wage rate negotiated between construction union and private employers."[5]

The only other documentary evidence of pre-April 1, 1984 contact between the City and Local 18 is a March 1, 1983 document involving Local 18 members who worked in the City's Water Department. According to a March 2, 1983 cover letter sent from the Commissioner of the Water Department to the Assistant Commissioner, the subject of the document is a staggered work week for the employees. Most significant about this document is that it was signed by the employees themselves, "acknowledg[ing] their agreement to the policy change." The Local 18 business representative's signature appears only in the capacity of witness to the employees' signatures.[6] Rather than an indication of exclusive recognition, this document

[4] C. Exh. 1, pp. 1-5.
[5] Post-Hearing Brief of Local 18, p. 11.
[6] C. Exh. 1, pp. 6-7.

corroborates the hearing testimony of CEO witness Anthony Mangano, who stated that he understood that he was on his own regarding conditions of employment.[7]

The earliest documentation of specific discussions on working conditions between the City and Local 18 are July and August 1987 letters involving efforts to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement.[8] Such efforts, even if they culminated in a written collective bargaining agreement, could not make Local 18 a deemed-certified representative because the critical date, April 1, 1984, had long passed. "Private agreements reached after April 1, 1984 cannot bestow on the employee organizations involved deemed-certified status and do not confer 4117 rights." Akron, supra at 3-82.

In sum, the parties in Bedford Hts. engaged in regular, full-fledged contract negotiations. The relationship between the City and Local 18 does not rise to the level of contract negotiations. In Bedford Hts., the description of the bargaining unit was clear. In this case, no evidence of a bargaining-unit description exists. And finally, in Bedford Hts., the employee organization had a written memorandum of understanding with the City effective January 1984 to December 1985, even though the written agreement was silent on the recognition issue. In the instant case, the City and Local 18 never signed a written agreement.

"Section 4 of the Temporary Law was designed to maintain the status quo in those public sector employer-employee collective-bargaining relationships predating April 1, 1984. But not all the degrees, shapes and forms of collective bargaining permitted by Chapter 4117 result in deemed-certified status. Only the existence of exclusive recognition on April 1, 1984 creates deemed-certified status after April 1, 1984." Akron, supra at 3-83 to 3-84. The record in the case at issue does not establish that the relationship between the City and Local 18 was one of exclusive recognition on April 1, 1984. Thus, Local 18 never was a deemed-certified representative of the CEOs employed by the City.

2. If Question No. 1 is answered affirmatively, how long may a deemed certified representative retain that status if Local 18 never complied with the reporting requirements of Ohio Revised Code Section 4117.19?

The answer to Question No. 1 is no. Therefore, Question No. 2 is not applicable.

3. Was Local 18 the "exclusive representative" of those persons employed by the City of Cleveland as construction equipment operators anytime during the period of 1994 through 1998?

No, Local 18 was not the exclusive representative of the CEOs at any time. Under Question No. 1, supra, Local 18 was not deemed certified. Furthermore, it is

[7] T. 98, 112.
[8] F.F. No. 7.

undisputed that SERB has never certified Local 18 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative for the CEOs under § 4117.05.

4. Did Local 18 negotiate with the City a decrease in compensation of those persons employed by the City as construction equipment operators without their knowledge or consent?

The record demonstrates that in 1998, the City and Local 18 informed the CEOs of the prevailing wage rate agreed to by Local 18 and the City to settle a contempt action. The CEOs did not consent to the prevailing wage rate agreed upon.

After 1993, the City disputed the prevailing wage rate it was required to pay the CEOs. The City argued that it was entitled to offset certain items from the private sector prevailing wage rate. Local 18 then filed a contempt action to compel the City to comply with the terms of IUOE, supra. In 1996, Local 18 members working for the City voted, at a meeting called by Local 18 President Snell, on whether to authorize Local 18 to negotiate a contract with the City. The members voted no. Thereafter, in 1998, Local 18 and the City resolved their litigated dispute over the calculation of the prevailing wage rate. Local 18 President Dudley Snell and Assistant City Law Director Thomas Corrigan held a meeting with the CEOs to explain how Local 18 and the City had calculated the prevailing wage rate.[9] At this meeting, the CEOs were not asked to approve or consent to the prevailing wage rate agreed to by Local 18 and the City in settlement of the contempt action.

5. Did Local 18 falsely inform the City that those persons employed by the City as construction equipment operators had agreed to a decrease in compensation?

No. No evidence is present in the record that Local 18 informed the City that the CEOs themselves, as individual employees, had agreed to a decrease in compensation.

6. Were the wages of the construction equipment operators who were appellees in Consolo v. City of Cleveland (2004), 103 Ohio St.3d 362, [2004-Ohio-5389,] the result of collective bargaining between Local 18 and the City?

No. Collective bargaining cannot be held to have occurred because Local 18 never was the exclusive representative of the CEOs within the meaning of Chapter 4117. The wages paid to the CEOs were based upon the City Charter provision requiring the City to pay the prevailing wage rate in the Building Agreement negotiated between construction unions and private employers. Every witness who testified confirmed that Local 18 informed the City of the amount of prevailing wages only, and that Local 18 never was authorized by the CEOs to negotiate terms of employment.

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[9] F.F. No. 10.

Furthermore, the City and Local 18 do not dispute that they never entered into a collective bargaining agreement. The City did not enter into a collective bargaining agreement with a bargaining unit of CEOs until February 2005, after SERB certified MCEOLC as the CEOs' exclusive representative in January 2003.

7. Did the City and Local 18 negotiate and implement a benefits package that provided the construction equipment operators described above in Paragraph (6) with equal or better benefits than are provided by the City Charter?

No. No evidence is present in the record that any benefits package was negotiated or implemented for the CEOs until February 2005, after SERB certified MCEOLC as the CEOs' exclusive representative in January 2003.